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Going digital: Computerized land registration and credit access in India  
 
Abstract: Despite strong beliefs that property titling and registration will enhance credit access, empirical evidence in 
support of such effects remains scant. The gradual roll-out of computerization of land registry systems across Andhra 
Pradesh’s 387 sub-registry offices (SROs) allows us to combine quarterly administrative data on credit disbursed by all 
commercial banks for a 11 year period (1997-2007) aggregated to the SRO level with the date of shifting registration from 
manual to digital. Computerization had no credit effect in rural areas but led to increased credit-supply in urban ones. A 
marked increase of registered urban mortgages due to computerization supports the robustness of the result. At the same 
time, estimated impacts from reduction of stamp duty are much larger, suggesting that, without further changes in the 
property rights system, impacts of computerization will remain marginal.  
 
1. Introduction 
Even  though  the  Coasian  world  of  neoclassical  economics  departs  from  existence  of  well-defined 
property rights that can be enforced at no costs, it is increasingly recognized that in practice establishment 
and maintenance of institutions to define such rights and make information on them available freely is an 
important role for the public sector. In fact, such institutions will have far-reaching impacts on economic 
efficiency by affecting three areas, namely (i) the incentives to exert effort and make investments; (ii) the 
scope for separating ownership of an asset from its control; and (iii) the potential for financial market 
development (Besley and Ghatak 2008). The fact that, in many underdeveloped economies, formal land 
rights are largely absent has led influential observers to argue for acceleration of land titling to help 
transform large amounts of ‘dead assets’ into ‘live capital’ and provide the preconditions for emergence 
of a financial sector (de Soto 2000). However, despite a strong belief in the credit-enhancing impacts of 
property institutions, empirical evidence in support of such effects remains scant and sometimes non-
existent even where programs had initiated with the express purpose of increasing credit access.  
To explore the effect of improved functioning of property registries on credit access, this paper analyzes 
the impact of the Computer-Assisted Registration of Deeds program (CARD) that computerized land 
records in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (AP). In contrast to traditional titling programs that focus on 
adjudicating  rights  on  the  ground  for  the  first time,  this  intervention  reduced  the  cost  of registering 
transactions for owners and that of accessing information on property rights, especially for lenders. At the 
same  time,  it  affected  neither  the  quality  of  the  information  maintained  in  land  registries  nor  the 
institutional structure of land administration. Any potential benefits will thus be limited to those already 
in the formal system or able to join it at low cost. This makes such reforms of limited interest in situations 
where property registries do not exist. At the same time, registry reform is amenable to the innovative use 
of information technology to land administration, an area which India has pioneered and the impact of 
which remains controversial and not well documented empirically. An evaluation of simple procedural 
reform  that  stops  short  of  more  far-reaching  institutional  changes  or  rights  determination  as  such 
measures have recently gained currency, in large parts supported by initiatives such as ‘doing business’   2 
(World Bank 2009). Proponents of such an approach argue that a focus on ‘low hanging fruit’ can create 
political momentum for more far-reaching reforms by demonstrating producing tangible benefits quickly 
(Djankov and McLiesh 2007). Opponents retort that focus on a very simplified set of indicators without 
consideration of the channels through which effects materialize, the quality of the underlying information, 
and the outreach of the concerned institutions, could result in window-dressing that, instead of acting as a 
stepping-stone towards broader reform, may obfuscate and obscure the real issues (Arrunada 2007),  
Computerization of land registries can possibly affect the operation of property rights institutions and 
credit markets in two ways. First, it can lower the cost of registering property transfers by reducing the 
processing time  required and  by eliminating discretionary side payments that have traditionally been 
associated with property registration. Second, it can make it easier for third parties such as banks to 
access information on property rights by making records, including abstracts of past transactions, so-
called encumbrance certificates (ECs), available online. To the extent that this will increase the benefit-
cost  ratio  of  registering  property  transfers,  it  can  prompt  more  owners  to  register  their  transactions, 
thereby reducing the level of informality. Also, easier access to information to ascertain the ownership 
status or existence of pre-existing liens on any property that might be offered as collateral can reduce 
bank’s cost of extending credit, thus possibly leading to an expansion of credit supply either by lending to 
customers  who  had  previously  been  ineligible  or  by  extending  more  credit  to  existing  ones.  As 
computerization did not alter quality or nature of the underlying information or other elements of the 
transaction costs of registering property, the nature and magnitude of predicted effects is likely to differ 
depending on initial conditions, e.g. between rural and urban areas.  
To empirically test these predictions, we use annual data on the volume of registered sales and mortgages 
by sub-registry office (SROs) from 1997 to 2007 as well as quarterly data on credit supply from the 
Reserve Bank of India, aggregated from individual branches to the block level, for an 11-year period that 
covers  the  state-wide  roll  out  of  this  intervention.  As  computerization  affects  the  cost  accessing 
information or making changes to it, rather than the quality of the underlying data, our primary emphasis 
is on credit effects, a focus that is also warranted by the fact that in past studies credit effects have proved 
to be most elusive. Transaction data are then used to explore the plausibility of our results. Moreover, we 
use the fact that taxes (‘stamp duties’) to be paid when transferring property were changed in  2005 
throughout the state but differently for rural and urban areas, to compare the size of computerization 
effects to those of a known reduction of the costs of transferring land.  
We find a computerization-induced credit increase of some 15 percent in urban areas but no credit impact 
in rural areas. This is consistent with evidence of a significant computerization-induced increase in the 
number  of registered  mortgages  -but  not sales-  in  urban areas but  no  measured  effect of  CARD  on   3 
registered land transactions of any type in rural ones. By comparison, reduction of stamp duties had a 
consistent and quantitatively large impact on all types of transactions in rural and urban areas. Clear 
evidence of credit effects in part of our sample highlights that property rights affect economic outcomes. 
At the same time, our results also highlight that credit effects will depend on the quality of the underlying 
information  and  the  resulting  reduction  of  transaction  costs  associated  with  accessing  property 
information. These  factors  will  need  to  be  borne in  mind  when  designing  property  rights  reform  or 
making predictions on its potential impacts.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the context by drawing together the literature on 
credit and land regularization, as well as the details of the computerization system in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh.  Section  three  discusses  estimation  strategy,  introduces  the  data  used,  and  presents  basic 
descriptive statistics. Section four presents empirical results on credit, and volume of transactions, and 
Section five concludes by drawing out implications for research and policy.  
2. Context and hypotheses  
To frame the debate, we highlight how, and under what conditions, programs to clarify and adjudicate 
rights or improve access to the registry could affect land-related investment and credit access. Description 
of institutional arrangements governing land administration in India, the nature of the computerization 
program in AP, and other relevant reforms undertaken over the same time period, then illustrates how this 
applies to the case at hand and provides a basis for predictions regarding the impact of these interventions.  
2.1 Conceptual links between land registration and credit access 
Development  economists  have  long  highlighted  the  central  role  of  institutions,  i.e.  socially  imposed 
constraints on human interaction that structure incentives in any exchange, in shaping growth and the 
distribution of its gains among the population (Greif 1993, North 1971). How land rights are defined and 
distributed in a society will determine social relations, the power structure, and the potential for economic 
development. At virtually all levels of development, property rights to land and associated real estate are a 
key institution which, backed by the enforcement power of the state or the community, allow individuals 
or groups to lay residual claim to benefit streams from land. From the earliest days of recorded human 
history, awareness of the social and economic benefits from secure and well-defined property rights and 
public recording of transactions led many societies to develop customs and laws to define land rights, set 
up registries to record such rights (often to obtain tax revenue), and establish courts and police to enforce 
them (Powelson 1988). At the same time, the notion that in some societies, lack of formal property rights 
to land may limit the scope for investment and operation of financial markets has prompted calls for 
interventions from various sides. Two types of interventions to improve this state of affairs are common.    4 
In situations where property rights are ill-defined or entirely lacking, a systematic clarification of land 
rights through a process of adjudication and first-time registration will be required. Such ‘traditional’ 
interventions to clarify and register rights, are normally justified with reference to the expected increases 
in tenure security (and reduced level of enforcement efforts by owners to exclude others), in incentives 
for land-related investment and informal transfers of land to better users. The magnitude and distribution 
of such benefits will depend on the reduction in enforcement efforts afforded by formal recognition, the 
availability of investment opportunities, skill differences among local land owners, and the incidence of 
formal or informal land rights before the intervention. Benefits will normally be larger in cases where 
potential for land-related investment is high, tenure has been insecure or affected by conflict, and where 
documentation generated will be respected and affect behavior by third parties. Positive impacts of more 
secure land tenure on investment and land values in rural areas have been demonstrated in China (Jacoby 
et al. 2002), Thailand (Feder et al. 1988), Latin America (Bandiera 2007), Eastern Europe (Rozelle and 
Swinnen 2004), and Africa (Deininger and Jin 2006, Goldstein and Udry 2008). In urban areas, efforts to 
enhance tenure security have led to increased levels of self-assessed land values (Lanjouw and Levy 
2002), greater investment in housing (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2005), and female empowerment (Field 
2005). Receipt of titles has allowed former squatters, especially women, to join formal labor markets 
instead of staying at home to guard their land, thereby increasing their income and reducing child labor 
(Field 2007). Joint titles are credited with having helped to reduce fertility and increase investment in 
children’s human capital (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2004). In Vietnam, awarding certificates is estimated 
to have prompted higher investment in perennials and prompted households, especially the poor, to spend 
more time in non-agricultural activities (Do and Iyer 2008). 
Even if land rights are defined on the ground, improving access to such information through improved 
functioning of land registration can have positive effects on credit access. The reason is that availability 
of reliable information on land ownership at low cost via a public registry without the need of physical 
inspection or inquiry with neighbors reduces the cost of exchanging land in formal markets and provides 
the basis for low-cost use of land as collateral for credit.
1 Provision of credit is risky because uncertainty 
and  asymmetric  information  lead  to  credit rationing  in  equilibrium  and  reduced  lending  volumes 
compared to a world of perfect information (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The use of collateral is a universal 
practice to reduce the extent of credit rationing and improve welfare. Its immobility and relative 
indestructibility make land ideal collateral. However, banks’ ability to use it for this purpose on a large 
scale is contingent on a formal and low-cost way to unambiguously ascertain land ownership or the 
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could then allow greater use of land as a collateral to access credit (Besley and Ghatak 2008, de Soto 2000).   5 
absence of other encumbrances for a specific plot (Arrunada 2009). In the absence of other obstacles to 
the functioning of land and financial markets, reliable land registries can thus help to increase credit 
access. As this will allow borrowers to obtain funding for projects the true risk of which is less than what 
lenders  would  assume  without  collateral,  this  would  increase  the  level  of  investment  and  improve 
economic  efficiency.  In  such  situations,  formalizing  land  tenure  can  encourage  financial  market 
development and use of financial instruments that draw on the abstract representation of property by 
formal titles (de Soto 2000).  
Quite surprisingly in view of the attention devoted to the use of land as collateral, evidence on credit 
effects is quite limited and often focused on land titling rather than registration. Moreover, while some 
studies report credit effects from land titling (Feder et al. 1988), there are many cases where credit effects 
from property rights reform were expected but did not materialize (Field and Torero 2006, Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2005). Failure to detect credit effects is often attributed either to insufficiently secure rights 
or household or land market characteristics such as risk aversion, absence of bankable projects, and 
illiquid land markets. High cost of registering subsequent transactions, if combined with limited benefits, 
often leads to a perception that the cost of registration exceeds the benefits from doing so (Deininger and 
Feder 2009). Whether, as implicitly assumed by approaches that focus on regulatory reform, reduction of 
the cost of registering and transferring property can have an impact is open to debate (Arrunada 2007) but 
has not been analyzed in the literature. India provides an ideal case for doing for two reasons. First, it has 
a system of land records with reasonably wide outreach but huge amount of duplication and inefficiency 
that leads to widespread conflict and property rights insecurity. At the same time, it has taken a leadership 
role in applying IT to land administration to make it easier to access information on property rights and 
reduce the cost of registering transactions.  
2.2 The institutional setting of land administration in India  
India’s system of land administration has its origin in colonial land taxation. Most of the institutions and 
processes currently in place resemble closely those established under British rule when land taxes (called 
‘land revenue’) constituted the main source of government income.
2 The primacy of revenue for land 
recording had two implications. First, land records were a fiscal instrument that focused on use rather than 
ownership and provided neither a unified spatial framework nor mechanisms or incentives for owners to 
register transactions to keep their records up to date. In fact, it was  incumbent on the administration to 
update their records through re visional surveys, expected to be undertaken at  generational intervals of 
some 30 years. Second, original settlement surveys were restricted to agricultural lands, excluding forests 
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determined in a process called settlement that was first undertaken when a territory was incorporated into the empire. The nature of the settlement 
process continues to affect the nature and quality of land institutions and the nature subsequent growth (Banerjee and Iyer 2005).   6 
where the potential for revenue was low and urban areas inhabited by colonial elites who were not to be 
burdened  with  taxes.  Following  independence,  responsibility  for  land  policy  and  administration  was 
transferred to states and the importance of land taxes declined greatly. While the Revenue Department 
continues to maintain textual databases for rural land records, the reduced importance of land as a revenue 
source led to other functions taking priority over maintenance of land information (World Bank 2007).  
The flip side of the decline of the Revenue Department is the ascendancy of the Department of Stamps 
and Registration where deeds of land transactions are registered (stamped) and stored. Its raison d’etre is 
the 1882 Transfer of Property Act which stipulates that sale of any tangible immovable property worth 
Rs. 100 or more can only be made by registered instrument. As registrars will register any instrument 
presented to them without thoroughly checking its validity or the existence of countervailing claims, 
registration provide no conclusive evidence of ownership (Wadhwa 2002). Still, entries in the registry 
have value as they are admissible as evidence in court. Moreover, the registry department makes available 
summaries of all transactions that have been registered by a specific person or for a parcel through so-
called encumbrance certificates (ECs). While ECs can not preclude that undisclosed or registered claims 
may surface, they provide evidence of the transaction history that can enable legal experts to provide an 
assessment  of  the  likelihood  that  challenges  against  a  specific  claim  may  appear.  The  fact  that  any 
registered transaction incurs large amounts of stamp duty
3 has transformed property registration into a 
major source of government income (Alm et al. 2004). Given that it contributes as much as one third of 
revenue in many states, property registration has thus emerged as a  system parallel to land records, 
especially in urban areas where land records had not existed to start with.  
At the same time, property registration in many Indian states suffers from a number of problems. High 
fees and the fact that recording, storage, and retrieval of transactions were conducted on an entirely 
manual basis rendered the process cumbersome for customers and provided ample scope for petty and 
large-scale corruption. The need to pay ‘speed money’ to have certain transactions processed in a timely 
manner has been legendary and widespread.
4 More importantly, officials had significant discretion in 
determining property values, thereby reducing the  amount of stamp duty to be paid   on any given 
transaction  and pocketing part of the difference .  All  of  this  reduced  owners’  incentives  to  register 
transactions and drove land transfers into informality. Measures to improve the functioning of the registry 
system should thus have a direct impact on observed outcomes. 
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mortgages, often with surcharges for properties located in cities. Registration fee is normally between 0.5% and 2% of the property value.  
4 A large survey of  users of land administration services  in all states estimates   the amount of bribes paid annually in this sector at US $700 
million, three-quarters of the public spending on science, technology, and environment (Transparency International India 2005).    7 
In response to backlogs that delayed processing of simple registrations by more than 10 years and reports 
about undervaluation of property causing rampant corruption and revenue loss, the state of Maharashtra 
developed software that was deployed to all of the state’s land registry offices in 1997 through a public-
private  partnership.  Results  for  customers  and  government  were  very  positive:  standard  registration 
processes now take 30 minutes rather than years to complete and automated property valuation eliminated 
officials’  discretion.  The  number  of  registered  transfers  increased  by  more  than  50%,  from  about  1 
million (mn.) in 1998/99 to more than 1.5 mn. in 2004/05. Stamp duty collections more than doubled, 
from Rs. 16 billion. to Rs. 41 billion, despite a significant reduction in rates (from 13% to 8%) over the 
period.  The  initiative  provided  a  basis  for  more  thorough  modernization  of  land  administration  in 
Maharashtra and was copied by other states that had suffered from similar problems to a lesser extent.  
2.3 Computerization of land registries in Andhra Pradesh  
Following the model of Maharashtra, a program for Computer-Assisted Registration of Deeds, referred to 
as CARD, was introduced in Andhra Pradesh from the late 1990s. It comprised three elements, namely (i) 
streamlining of registration procedures to be followed in registration of property transactions at any of the 
state’s 387 SROs; (ii) automatic property valuation to eliminate officials’ discretion in setting fees; and 
(iii) digitization of all ECs from 1983 as well as making these and other key documents such market 
valuations and deed extracts available online to allow anybody to easily verify claims regarding property 
values and ownership. Contrary to Maharashtra where the scheme was implemented within one year, 
computerized registration was rolled out to cover all of the state’s 387 SROs, starting with those having 
the highest transaction volume. Figure 1 illustrates the roll-out of SRO computerization, indicating that 
54% of SROs were computerized in February 1999, 12% in November 2001, and the remainder in March 
2005. In 2005, i.e. after computerization had been completed, stamp duty rates were adjusted throughout 
the  state.  The  most  significant  reduction  was  from  13%  or  11%  for  sales  in  urban  or  rural  areas, 
respectively, to 9% and from 3% to 1% for gifts, partitions, and inheritances within the same family. 
Rates for registering mortgages remained unchanged throughout the period.  
Although CARD signified an improvement over the earlier situation, three shortcomings are generally 
noted, namely (i) lack of a spatial framework combined with a unique parcel identifier that would allow 
easy retrieval of all registered transactions for a given physical parcel; (ii) the continued need, even for 
banks, to rely on the services of professional lawyers to check on the quality of the information recorded 
in individual deeds due to lack of standardization; and (iii) limited outreach and coverage, especially in 
rural areas where land records continue to be more popular, due to failure to integrate registration with 
traditional land records and thus ensure automatic synchronization of records in case of changes to one of   8 
them. It thus allows us to test the extent to which reforms that improve the functioning of a registry 
system without radically changing the quality of the underlying information affects economic outcomes.  
As computerization affects the cost involved in accessing property information and registering transfers 
rather than the security or nature of the underlying rights, we do not expect it to affect land-related 
investment but rather credit supply and the number of registered transactions. One main interest is to 
ascertain the extent to which computerization-induced transaction cost reductions increased credit supply. 
Also, improved governance and reduced transaction costs may have made it worthwhile to conduct or 
register transactions that had not been undertaken or registered earlier, implying that we would expect to 
see an impact of CARD on the volume of registered transactions. The ability to compare the impact of 
computerization to that of a reduction in stamp duties can ideally provide a bound on the magnitude of the 
associated reduction in transaction cost.  
3. Data and estimation strategy  
Data on credit disbursed by commercial banks and the number of total registered transactions for 1997-
2007 point towards significant increases in supply of credit as well as land sales. To assess whether any of 
these increases can be attributed to computerization, we use the roll-out of this intervention across SROs 
to identify the impact of computerization on credit supply and transaction frequency in a way that can be 
compared to that of stamp duty reductions. Below we discuss the approach as well as the assumptions 
required to hold in order to be able to do so.  
3.1 Data and descriptive evidence  
We have quarterly data on credit disbursed by all scheduled commercial banks to retail customers for a 11 
year period in all of AP’s 1064 taluks (blocks) from India’s Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India, RBI).
5 
This provides a total of 44 observations per taluk, from Q1 of 1997 to Q4 of 2007, i.e at least 7 quarters 
before the first batch of registry offices was computerized to 2 years after the last of the state’s SROs had 
shifted to operated on a fully computerized basis. The quality and reliability of these data derives from the 
fact that they are based on routine reports which all scheduled commercial banks are required to submit to 
RBI at regular intervals. To match them to information on computerization, we aggregate up from the 
branch to the taluk level. This information is combined with annual data on the total number of registered 
land transactions (incl. sales and mortgages separately) for the period of 1997-2007 from the Andhra 
Pradesh  Department  of  Stamps  and  Registration  for  242  of  the  387  SROs  where  data  predating 
computerization were available in electronic form. As rural and urban land administration systems will 
                                                           
5  Scheduled  commercial  banks  include  all  public  and  private  sector  banks  with  the  exception  of  cooperative  banks  who 
contributed less than 10 percent to total lending from 1997 to 2006 (RBI 2008).    9 
differ from each other, we also use the 2001 Census of India to obtain the share of urban population in 
any taluk or SRO.
6 
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the dynamic nature of AP’s land and credit markets over the 
period  under  concern.  Overall,  the  volume  of credit  disbursed  more  than  tripled in real terms,  from 
approximately Rs. 700 billion in 1997 to Rs. 2,500 billion in 2007 (i.e. some Rs. 15,000 or US $ 300 per 
person). Prima facie most of the credit expansion happened after 2003, at a time when about two thirds of 
SROs in the state had already been computerized for some time. This suggests that more detailed analysis 
will be needed to assess the extent to which computerization is a factor driving the observed credit 
expansion. Similarly, the modest upward trend of sales observed before 2002 that was associated with an 
increase in the number of transactions from 0.4 to 0.5 mn., accelerated significantly thereafter and in 
particular after 2005, reaching almost 1 mn. in 2007. This translates into an increase from about 0.5 to 1.3 
transactions per 1,000 people and year.  
A summary of average amounts for the main transaction categories by SRO, separately for before and 
after computerization based on SRO specific computerization dates, is presented in Table 1. Amounts of 
credit vary between urban and rural areas with Rs. 2 bn. and 0.08 bn., respectively on average. After 
computerization, credit is estimated to have doubled in both; from Rs. 1 bn. to Rs. 2.37 bn. in urban and 
from Rs. 0.05 bn. to Rs. 0.11 bn. in rural areas. Evidence on registered transactions is consistent with this 
in terms of much higher numbers in urban than in rural areas that are driven by sales but very little 
movement in mortgages. Registered sales almost doubled after computerization, from 3,922 to 5,636 in 
urban and from 1,203 to 2,390 in rural areas. By contrast, there is little change over time in the number of 
registered mortgages between rural and urban areas (637 vs. 697) and a slight increase, from 672 to 796, 
that appears to remain confined to urban environments.  
3.2 Estimation strategy  
While the above changes are large, they may have been due to macro-economic conditions or location-
specific factors that were uncorrelated with CARD. In fact, influential observers have argued that, without 
more rigorous checks on data quality or process re-engineering, mere digitization of what may be largely 
outdated data from a very old system will have no economic benefit (Saxena 2005). Rigorous data on 
impacts of this intervention remains limited (Ahuja and Singh 2006) and whatever evidence is available 
focuses on rural land records rather than registration (Lobo and Balakrishnan 2002). To explore whether 
observed increases on credit supply are a causal effect that can be attributed to computerization, we 
exploit variation in the timing of this intervention across taluks. The estimating equation is  
                                                           
6 In a small number of cases where SROs did not match with taluk boundaries, we used lists of villages from the 2001 Census to 
establish a match.    10 
Cit = α0 + α1Compit + γi + θt  + εit  
where Cit is the log of credit disbursed in taluk i at quarter t,
7 γi s represent a full set of taluk fixed effects 
to control for unobserved time invariant heterogeneity such as differences in taluk-level endowments or 
economic structure that may affect the volume of recorded land transactions or credit disbursement, θt  
represents quarter*year fixed effects to control for time  varying factors such as  common demand or 
policy shocks that may affect disbursement of credit or land transactions across all taluks of the state. 
Standard  errors  are  clustered  at  taluk  level  throughout.  We  interact  computerization  with  indicator 
variables  for  the  amount  of  time  passed  since  the  intervention  to  explore  whether  potential 
computerization effects materialize instantaneously or only with some lag. A lag may, for example, be 
due to banks needing to get acquainted with the information provided online and rewrite loan approval 
procedures accordingly.  
Replacing Cit with Tit, i.e. the log of number of different types of transactions registered in SRO i in year t 
allows us to undertake similar analysis for transaction volume to explore whether some transactions, in 
particular mortgages, moved in parallel with credit supply. Though possible complementarities between a 
2005 state-wide change in stamp duties and computerization cannot be explored as by 2005 the latter had 
been completed, it is of interest to compare the impact of computerization to that of an exogenous change 
in stamp duty rates. This is possible as stamp duty varies between rural and urban areas.  
In  all  cases,  fixed  effects  estimates  are  used  to  deal  with  concerns  about  unobserved  time-invariant 
factors. Still, our identification strategy relies on the assumption that there are no unobserved factors that 
contributed to differential trends in growth of credit or registered land transactions between SROs that 
computerized early and those included in later batches. This is an important concern especially in view of 
the fact that roll-out of computerization was designed to move from high to low volume SROs. With 
credit and transaction data that go back to 1997, we can test for this explicitly by considering whether the 
timing of computerization is correlated with pre-existing levels and trends of credit. To do so we run 
probit  regressions  of  the  timing  of  computerization.  The  dependent  variable  is  1  if  the  SRO  was 
computerized in 1999 and 0 if the SRO was included later. Independent variables are levels or changes in 
credit or the number of registered transactions before computerization was introduced. 
Results from doing so are reported in appendix table A1 for credit (panel A) and number of transactions 
(panel B). Panel A suggests that neither levels nor changes in pre-computerization levels of credit had any 
impact on the timing of computerization. Coefficients on levels as well as changes are small and none 
statistically significant, giving us no reason to believe that the timing of computerization was correlated 
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with differential pre-existing trends in credit supply. For the 242 SROs for which we have information on 
number of transactions, panel B points towards high significance and positive sign of coefficients on the 
pre-computerization level of transactions. This is consistent with the roll-out plan that aimed to focus on 
high-transaction SROs first. At the same time, the coefficient on the change in transaction volume from 
1997 and 1998 is close to zero suggesting that pre existing trends in transaction volume are uncorrelated 
with the timing of SRO computerization.  
4. Econometric results  
We find that, once time and SRO fixed effects are controlled for, computerization did not affect credit 
supply in rural areas but enhanced it, by 15%, in urban ones. This is consistent with the fact that CARD 
had significant impact on the number of registered urban mortgages but not sales and that stamp duty 
reductions had a spatially less differentiated and quantitatively larger effect on the number of registered 
transactions. It suggests that, if property rights reforms are undertaken, all elements of the system will 
need to be considered.  
4.1 Did computerization increase credit supply? 
Results from the credit supply regression in table 2 are of interest in two respects. First, inclusion of time 
and location fixed effects is critical to avoid erroneous conclusions. This is visible from comparison of 
columns 1 and 3 where addition of the relevant indicator variables not only improves the regression’s fit 
but also illustrates that what might be interpreted as a significant and large effect of computerization on 
credit supply (almost a doubling as per column 1) is due largely to changes over time that affected all 
taluks and, to a lesser extent, location-specific factors. Once relevant controls are included, the point 
estimate  for  computerization  becomes  insignificantly  different  from  zero  and  even  turns  negative, 
suggesting that this intervention had little effect on credit supply overall.  
At the same time, the significant and positive coefficient of interacting the computerization variable with 
the share of urban population that points towards a positive impact of computerization on credit supply in 
urban but not rural areas. In urban SROs, computerization of land registries would, according to the point 
estimate, have increased credit supply by 15%. Interactions of computerization variables with indicators 
of the time elapsed since this intervention support the above conclusions; there is no evidence for lagged 
effects in the aggregate and the relevant coefficients are individually and jointly not significantly different 
from zero. By contrast, in urban areas, the effects appear to be persistent and tend to grow stronger over 
time, increasing from a significant  point estimate of 5% to 18% five quarters after computerization, 
possibly  as  a  result  of  banks  learning  about  the  uses  of  the  information  provided  by  computerized 
registries or adjusting their business process to take advantages of it more routinely.    12 
How to interpret these results? It is well known that changes in security of land tenure or availability of 
land  ownership  information  will  affect  credit  supply  only  if  agents  are  credit  constrained  and  have 
sufficient illiquid wealth that can be foreclosed upon at reasonable cost (Besley and Ghatak 2009). In 
rural India, these conditions may not hold for a number of reasons. First, India’s commercial banks are 
already required by law to direct 18% of their loan portfolio to rural areas so that there may be few credit-
worthy  projects  left  that  would  benefit  from  credit  access  with  reduced  transaction  cost  from  loan 
processing. Second, in rural Andhra Pradesh, the outreach of land registration is limited as both owners 
and banks prefer to use land records as the basis for processing credit applications. A main reason for this 
is that land records continue to be maintained manually by village-based representatives of the revenue 
department, implying lower transactions cost for updating them. Failure of officials or land owners to 
adhere to administrative processes that would help synchronize the two databases implies that registered 
deeds, if they exist at all, may be out of date.
 8 This would eliminate any transaction cost effect from 
registry computerization. Third, other policy restrictions, in particular land ownership ceilings, imply that 
rural  land  markets  are  not  very  liquid  and  that  therefore  foreclosure  may  be  associated  with  high 
transaction costs. Moreover, a history of often politically mandated agricultural debt cancellations may 
reduce banks’ confidence in their ability to recover rural debts through foreclosure in case of default.
9  
In urban areas on the other hand, absence of  land records implies that deeds registries will be the only 
source of data on land rights, land values will be higher, and better access to SROs will reduce  total cost 
of registration compared to rural ones. Any fixed reduction of registration cost (e.g. due to elimination of 
informal payments) would thus result in a bigger relative decline of total registration cost, increasing the 
incentive to register. Interviews with banks suggest that, in light of the fact that underlying information is 
neither perfect nor conclusive, banks will still need to conduct detailed legal checks on applicants before 
disbursing credit. Still,  online access to  ECs provides lenders with  low-cost access to  information on 
existing encumbrances, in particular  mortgages that can be used as  a low-cost pre-screening of loan 
applications and thus reduce the cost of lending in urban areas.  
4.2 Computerization as one factor affecting the number of land transactions 
Exploring the effect of computerization on number of transactions allows us to assess the plausibility of 
the credit supply effects ascertained earlier by looking at mechanisms that might underlie them. However, 
as transaction data is available only from a subset of SROs, the validity of arguments along this line will 
depend on the ability to demonstrate that SROs for which data are missing do not systematically differ 
from the rest in observable attributes so that results will not be drive by selectivity bias. Descriptive data 
                                                           
8 Having changes recorded at the village level is easier for owners than traveling to taluk headquarters but cases registries are often not updated.  
9 While available data from AP do not allow us to empirically discriminate between these explanations,  information from other states that have 
computerized records and registries and may have established village-based kiosks as well, could allow such testing.    13 
for the two samples of SROs show no statistically significant differences in a range of census-based 
socio-economic characteristics and credit access between the two groups. In fact, results from repeating 
the credit-supply regressions from Table 2 for the restricted sample of SROs with transaction data in 
appendix Table A2 are consistent to those obtained earlier, with point estimates for all the coefficients 
being very similar. This suggests that selection bias is unlikely to be an issue.  
Table 3 reports results, separately for sales in columns 4-6, mortgages in columns 7-9, and total number 
of transactions (i.e. including sales, mortgages, and non-monetary transfers) in columns 1-3. In line with 
what was found earlier, we note that, after controlling for time and SRO fixed effects, computerization is 
estimated to not have had any effect on either of these variables in the aggregate. At the same time, we 
find significant computerization effects on the number of total transactions in urban areas, with a point 
estimate of 39%. However, there is no evidence for lagged effects in either urban or rural areas; in the 
former the full impact materializes in the first year after computerization with only a marginal increase 
thereafter while in the latter, passage of time does not lead to a more significant effect. Disaggregation by 
type of transfer suggests that, while computerization did not contribute to the rapid rise in the number of 
registered sales that was observed earlier even in urban areas, it led to a marked increase in the number of 
mortgages which is estimated to have increased some 60% as a consequence of the intervention. This is 
consistent with the notion that, in view of the large difference in stamp duty for the two transaction types 
(13% for sales vs. 3% for mortgages) in urban areas before the 2005 reduction, a given computerization-
induced reduction in registration cost would have had a bigger relative effect on mortgages than on sales.  
Table 4 provides results from an ‘augmented’ regression that includes not only computerization but also 
an indicator variable for reduced levels of stamp duty and its interaction with an urban indicator. The 
coefficients on computerization in urban areas are very similar to those obtained earlier. At the same time, 
stamp  duty  reduction is  estimated to  have  had  a  significant,  positive,  and  quantitatively  large  effect 
everywhere. The notion that registration is price elastic is supported by the finding that, for mortgages, 
the stamp duties for which remained unchanged in 2005, indicator variables are insignificant throughout. 
For other transactions, in particular sales, duty reductions are estimated to have increased the number of 
registered transaction by more than 50%, with no additional impact in urban areas. Together with earlier 
findings,  this  suggests  that  the  relative  size  of  the  computerization-induced  implicit  reduction  of 
transaction costs for sales -and for property registration in rural areas more generally- was too small to 
have had a measurable impact on observed transactions frequency. Although lack of more information on 
total costs of registering property precludes us from putting a bound on the size of any computerization-
induced transaction cost reduction, we conclude that these have been small overall. It supports the notion 
that the impacts of computerization are context-specific.    14 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, in contrast to studies that fail to empirically 
support credit effects from land titling, we demonstrate that reduced cost of updating and accessing land 
information can significantly increase urban credit access. Such effects are remarkable given that the 
shortcomings of land administration in India are widely recognized, in particular the fact that information 
provided by land registries falls far short of the security conveyed by full title (Panagariya 2008). In 
contrast to conventional wisdom that views full title as a precondition for credit effects, this suggests that, 
if foreclosure is possible , better access to land information of any type can help improve credit market 
functioning. Given the time and cost involved in establishment and maintenance of a full-fledged titling 
system,  this  is  very  relevant  for  policy.  It  also  implies  that,  where  credit  markets  exist  and  operate 
reasonably  well,  there  is  considerable  scope  for  better  access  to  reasonably  reliable  information  on 
property ownership to improve the functioning of financial markets. Still, in the context of India, further 
progress  on  further  reduction  of  the  transaction  costs  involved  in  ascertaining  land  ownership,  e.g. 
through unique parcel identifiers, a spatial framework to avoid overlaps, and integration of registry with 
land record information could help to bring about further gains.  
While the ability to demonstrate a credit effect sets our paper apart from other studies, one should not 
forget that -compared to the estimated impact of stamp duty reductions and the overall expansion of credit 
supply during the period under concern- the estimated magnitude of this effect is small, its outreach 
limited to urban property owners, and its impact on land markets and allocative efficiency negligible. In 
fact, the evidence of registration being very price elastic suggests that regulatory reforms are likely to lead 
to the desired results only if they provide affected parties with tangible benefits the magnitude of which 
exceeds the cost of formal registration - and that by implication the costs of registering most types of 
property transfers in AP remain high compared to the benefits gained from doing so. This illustrates that, 
while computerization of existing systems can provide benefits, more far-reaching measures are likely to 
be needed to broaden and deepen these effects. The fact that computerization of land registries has not 
prompted adoption of more far-reaching property reforms suggests that th e link between ‘quick wins’ 
and more far-reaching reform efforts is not automatic
 10 and that the former do not unequivocally identify 
the areas that should be the focus of subsequent efforts.  
Methodologically,  our  results  suggest  that  use  of  high  frequency  administrative  data  rather  than 
information from one or two rounds of household surveys provides considerable potential. Comparing 
evidence from such data with what emerges from household surveys would be of interest to provide 
                                                           
10 , The Indian Government has adopted a large national program of land records modernization that with a volume of US $ 0.5 bn. over the next 
4 years but take-up by states has been low.   15 
conclusions on the extent to which failure to find significant impacts could be due to the data used rather 
than the absence of such effects. The fact different Indian states have taken a variety of routes to improve 
the functioning of their land administration systems suggests that similar study for other states, especially 
those with approaches significantly different from the one taken in AP, could provide valuable insights on 
the magnitude and distribution of the economic effects to be expected from property rights interventions. 
Prime among these are efforts to integrate land records and registries and to improve local access, e.g. 
through kiosks established in partnership with the private sector. Evidence from other states may also 
provide an opportunity to quantify and analyze effects of land administration reform on governance and 
corruption,  an  area  that  is  of  great  importance  in  the  Indian  context  empirically  but  on  which  little 
information was available in our case. Both the methodological and substantive lesson from this study are 
likely to be of great relevance far beyond India.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
   
All  Before  After 
     
Computerization 
Total  Credit  0.24  0.10  0.35 
 
Sales  2207  1310  2818 
 
Mortgages  664  650  673 
Rural  Credit  0.08  0.05  0.11 
 
Sales  1854  1203  2342 
 
Mortgages  637  631  644 
Urban  Credit  2.00  1.00  2.37 
 
Sales  5815  3922  6244 
 
Mortgages  697  672  796 
Note: Nominal values of credit are deflated using the RBI whole sale price index with 
1993-94 as the base year. Credit is in billions of 1993 Rupees.    18 
Table 2: Effect of computerization on credit access 
 
Dependent variable: log of credit disbursed by banks 
   
 
      Computerization   0.981  0.471  -0.003  -0.013 
 
 
[0.011]**  [0.015]**  [0.010]  [0.011] 










  Computerization * Q1-Q4  
 
 
   
0.002 
   
 
   
[0.011] 
Computerization * Q5-  
 
 
   
-0.022 
   
 
   
[0.014] 
Computerization * Urban *Q1-Q4  
 
 
   
0.048 
   
 
   
[0.024]* 
Computerization * Urban * Q5-  
 
 
   
0.184 
   
 
   
[0.047]** 
Quarter*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Taluk Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  47,871  47871  47,871  47,871  47,871 
R-squared  0.21  0.42  0.97  0.97  0.97 
Notes: Taluk and year*quarter fixed effects included throughout. Robust standard errors clustered at the taluk level.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Effect of computerization on volume of registered transactions 
   Total Transactions   Sales  Mortgages 
Computerization   0.058  0.017 
 
0.021  0.013 
 
0.133  0.127 
 
 
[0.037]  [0.036] 
 
[0.035]  [0.037] 
 
[0.086]  [0.090] 
  Comp.* Urban Share   0.389 
   
0.076 
   
0.608 
 
   
[0.083]** 
   
[0.092] 
   
[0.200]** 
  Comp.* Y1-Y3 
   
0.047 
   
0.004 
   
0.156 
     
[0.042] 
   
[0.038] 
   
[0.097] 
Comp.* Y4 + 
   
0.114 
   
0.068 
   
0.225 
     
[0.076] 
   
[0.066] 
   
[0.163] 
Comp.* Urban *  Y1-Y3 
 
0.312 
   
0.071 
   
0.542 
     
[0.080]** 
   
[0.089] 
   
[0.203]** 
Comp.* Urban * Y4 + 
 
0.387 
   
0.146 
   
0.601 
     
[0.103]** 
   
[0.118] 
   
[0.238]** 
Observations  2587  2587  2587  2587  2587  2587  2587  2587  2587 
R-squared  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.89  0.89  0.89  0.58  0.58  0.58 
Note: All regressions include year and SRO fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the SRO level.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Effect of computerization and stamp duty reduction on transaction volume  
   Total  Sales  Mortgages 
Comp.  0.059  0.021  0.021  0.022  0.093  0.097 
  [0.035]  [0.038]  [0.035]  [0.037]  [0.096]  [0.096] 
Stampduty Reduction  0.512  0.496  0.531  0.518  0.173  0.198 
  [0.048]**  [0.053]**  [0.051]**  [0.057]**  [0.115]  [0.125] 




























Observations  2,587  2,587  2,587  2,587  2,587  2,587 
R-squared  0.82  0.82  0.89  0.89  0.58  0.58 
Note: All regressions include year and SRO fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the SRO level.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table A1: Regression of computerization timing on initial values and changes in credit and transactions 
Panel A: Credit 








  Credit in 1998 
 
0.001  -0.008 
 
   
[0.001]  [0.004] 
  Change in Credit 1998-1997 
     
0.001 
       
[0.000] 
Observations  387  387  387  387 
R-squared  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11 
 
Panel B: Transactions  








  Transaction Volume in 1998 
 
0.002  0.001 
 
   
[0.0003]**  [0.001] 
  Change in Transaction Volume 1998-1997 
   
0.0003 
       
[0.0002] 
Observations  242  242  242  242 
R-squared  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31 
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if a SRO computerized in 1999 and 0 if this happened in 2001 or 
2005. Standard errors in brackets.  Change in credit or transaction volume is the absolute change at SRO 
level.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   22 
Table A2: Effect of computerization on credit supply in subset of SROs 
 
Dependent variable: log of credit disbursed by banks 
  
          Computerization   1.053  0.62  -0.003  -0.012 
 
 
[0.015]**  [0.020]**  [0.013]  [0.013] 
  Comp*Urban Share  
   
0.143 
 
       
[0.052]** 
  Post0_4 Quarters 
       
-0.005 
         
[0.014] 
Post 5+Quarters 
       
-0.015 
         
[0.017] 
Post0_4 Quarters*Urban Share 
       
0.058 
         
[0.033]* 
Post 5+Quarters*Urban Share 
       
0.167 
         
[0.060]** 
Quarter*Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Taluk Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  30,025  30,025  30,025  30,025  30,025 
R-squared  0.14  0.21  0.97  0.97  0.97 
Notes: Taluk and year*quarter fixed effects included throughout. Robust standard errors clustered at the taluk level.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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